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Appendix 
 
A. Contract with two agents in the electoral period. 
 Problem of constrained optimization  
 
The Lagrangian for this problem is 
(A1) L (t, λ) = E (U – u) + λ1 g1+ λ2 g2 + λ3 g3+ λ4 g4 
assuming:  
            g1 = E(Ib | eb = 1) - E(Ib | eb = 0) = (Tb – tb) [Pr(Bs | eb = 1) - Pr(Bs | eb = 0) - Cb
(A2) g2 = E(Ib | eb = 1) = tb [1 - Pr(Bs | eb = 1)] + Tb Pr(Bs | eb = 1) - Cb 
            g3 = E(Ip | ep = 0) - E(Ip | ep = 1) = (Tp - tp) [Pr(Ps | ep = 1) - Pr(Ps | ep = 0)] + Cp
            g4 = E(Ip | ep = 0) = tp Pr(Ps | ep = 0) + Tp [1 - Pr(Ps | ep = 0)]  
The first-order conditions are given by 
(A3) ∂L/∂tb = 0   ,   ∂L/∂Tb = 0    ,    ∂L/∂tp = 0    ,    ∂L/∂Tp = 0 
  
             λ1 g1 = 0 
(A4) λ2 g2 = 0 
             λ3 g3 = 0 
             λ4 g4 = 0 
 
(A5) g1 ≥ 0   g2 ≥ 0      g3 ≥ 0   g4 ≥ 0 
 
(A6) λi ≥ 0 
We express constraints gi through the probabilities introduced with (3). For this purpose, we see 
that, as in E(U-u), in making his assessments each agent can be expected to think that the other 
agent is almost sure to make the choice that is most advantageous for himself. For instance, BA will 
think that, as it is an election period, CB will make no effort, while CB will be convinced that BA 
will make an effort. In formulae this mean that conditions (13)-(16) become 
(A7) E(Ib | eb = 1 ∩ ep = 0) = E(Ib | e10) ≥ E(Ib | eb = 0 ∩ ep = 0) = E(Ib | e00) 
(A8) E(Ib | e10) ≥ 0 
(A9) E(Ip | eb = 1 ∩ ep = 0) = E(Ip | e10) ≥ E(Ip | eb = 1 ∩ ep = 1) = E(Ip | e11) 
(A10) E(Ip | e10) ≥ 0 
 
and the gi will become 
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(A11)  
g1 = (Tb – tb)[Pr(Bs | e10) - Pr(Bs | e00)] - Cb = (Tb – tb ) (P1b – P3b) – Cb
g2 = tb [1- Pr(Bs | e10)] + Tb Pr(Bs | e10) - Cb = tb (1 – P1b) + Tb P1b – Cb
g3 = (Tp - tp)[Pr(Ps | e11) - Pr(Ps | e10)] + Cp
g4 = tp Pr(Ps | e10) + Tp [1 - Pr(Ps | e10)] 
To express (A9) and (A10) we calculate the conditional probabilies of Ps with respect to eij: 
(A12)       A = Pr(Ps | e10) = Pr(Ps ∩ Bs | e10) + Pr(Ps ∩ - Bs | e10) =  
                     = Pr(Bs | e10) Pr(Ps | Bs ∩ e10) + Pr(-Bs | e10) Pr(Ps | - Bs ∩ e10) = 
                     = P1b P3p + (1 – P1b) P0p . 
Likewise: 
(A13)      B = Pr(Ps | e11) = Pr(Ps ∩ Bs | e11) + Pr(Ps ∩ - Bs | e11) =  
                   = Pr(Bs | e11) Pr(Ps | Bs ∩ e11) + Pr(-Bs | e11) Pr(Ps | - Bs ∩ e11)=   
                   = P2b P1p + (1- P2b) P2p. 
 
(A14)     C = Pr(Ps | e01) = P0b P1p + (1- P0b) P2p 
 
(A15)     D = Pr(Ps | e00) = P3b P3p + (1- P3b) P0p 
It should be noticed that if P0p ≤ P3p  then  A ≤ P3p and if P1p > P2p then  B > P2p.  
With equal effort being made by the banking authority, prices have more probability of being stable 
if there is an effort in this direction on the part of the agent of monetary policy. We therefore expect 
A ≤ B and D ≤ C. Moreover, with equal effort being made by the authority in charge of monetary 
policy, the probability of stable prices is greater if the banking system is stable (see (3’)) and 
therefore we expect  
D ≤ C ≤ B; A ≤ B. 
This results in: 
(A16)  
g1 = (Tb – tb) (P1b – P3b) – Cb
g2 = tb (1 – P1b) + Tb P1b – Cb
g3 = (Tp – tp) [B – A] + Cp
g4 = tp A + Tp [1 – A] 
The first-order conditions (A3) translate into: 
              -u’(tb) [P0p (1-P1b) + (1 - P0p) (1 - P1b)] - λ1 (P1b - P3b) + λ2 (1 - P1b) = 0 
              -u’(Tb) [P3p P1b + (1 - P3p) P1b] + λ1 (P1b - P3b) + λ2 P1b = 0 
              -u’(tp) A –  λ3 (B – A) + λ4 A = 0 
              -u’(Tp) (1 – A) + λ3 (B – A) + λ4 (1 – A) = 0 
or, if u’(t) is substituted with the value of the derivative of the utiltity function considered in point 
(10), we have: 
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(A17)  
bt = [- λ1 (P1b - P3b) + λ2 (1 - P1b)] / (1 - P1b) 
bT  = [λ1 (P1b - P3b) + λ2 P1b] / P1b
pt  = -λ3 (B – A) / A + λ4 
pT  = λ3 (B - A) / (1 – A) + λ4
Therefore, provided 0 < P1b < 1 and  0 < A < 1 
(A18)  
bt  = λ2 - λ1 (P1b - P3b) / (1 - P1b) 
bT  = λ2 + λ1 (P1b - P3b) / P1b
pt  = λ4 - λ3 (B – A) / A  
pT = λ4 + λ3 (B – A) / (1 – A)    
Conditions (A4)-(A6) lead to the examination of various cases, simplified by the fact that the first 
two of (A4) are related to tb and Tb, while the other two are related to tp and Tp.  As we want to find 
solutions that maximize E(U-u), since –u is decrescent, the solution to the problem will be the one 
that makes u the lowest. Remember that u(t) is the cost incurred by the politician to pay the agents 
of the two different authorities. When this cost is lower, the politician’s utility is greater. 
 
Analysis of the cases that solve the optimization problem with two agents in the electoral period. 
 
In examining the various cases that can eventuate, we must remember that considering λi = 0 simply 
means ignoring the constraint gi ≥ 0. 
The cases we should examine to verify conditions (A4-A6) are:  
I)         λ1 = 0, g2 = 0, g1 ≥ 0 
II) λ2 = 0, g1 = 0, g2 ≥ 0 
III) λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0 
IV) g1 = 0, g2 = 0 
V) λ3 = 0, g4 = 0, g3 ≥ 0 
VI) λ4 = 0, g3 = 0, g4 ≥ 0 
VII) λ3 = 0, λ4 = 0 
VIII) g3 = 0, g4 = 0 
 
For I) λ1 = 0, g2 = 0, g1 ≥ 0  we have: 
bt  =  λ2
bT  = λ2  
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 tb (1 – P1b) + Tb P1b – Cb = 0 
(Tb – tb) (P1b – P3b) – Cb ≥ 0 
It follows that, if  tb = Tb , then for the fourth equation the result is -Cb ≥ 0, and therefore it can only 
be Cb = 0 and tb = Tb = 0. 
 If, however,  tb = - Tb  then, for the third equation, we have  
(A19)  - tb = Tb = Cb / (2 P1b – 1) 
and it must be   
(A20) P3b ≤ 1/2 < P1b. 
The first inequality derives from the fourth eqation. 
For  II) λ2 = 0, g1 = 0  we have: 
| tb | =  - λ1 (P1b - P3b) / (1 - P1b) 
| Tb | = λ1 (P1b - P3b) / P1b
(Tb – tb) (P1b – P3b) – Cb = 0 
tb (1 – P1b) + Tb P1b – Cb ≥ 0. 
The first equation can be verified only if λ1 = 0 or P1b = P3b, but in both cases there would be tb = Tb
= 0 and then, for the third and fourth, there would be Cb ≤ 0 and therefore Cb = 0.  
III) λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0 would give, for (A18)  
 tb = Tb = 0 
as in the previous case, provided Cb = 0. 
Lastly,  IV) g1 = 0, g2 = 0 gives the system: 
(Tb – tb) (P1b – P3b) – Cb = 0 
tb (1 – P1b) + Tb P1b – Cb = 0 
whose solution is: 
(A21)     tb =  – Cb P3b / (P1b – P3b) 
             Tb =  Cb (1 – P3b) / (P1b – P3b) 
This solution is obtained from (A18)  by saying: 
λ1 = Cb P1b (1 - P1b) (1 - 2 P3b) / (P1b - P3b)2   
λ2 = Cb (P1b + P3b – 2 P1b P3b ) / (P1b - P3b) . 
For it to be λ1 ≥ 0, it will have to be P3b ≤ 1/2, as well as being P1b > P3b. 
Let us examine the case V) λ3 = 0, g4 = 0. 
From (A18) it is deduced that  |tp |= |Tp| and, from g4 = 0, it follows that  either tp=Tp= 0, or 
 tp = - Tp and, from g4 = 0, it follows that Tp (1 - 2A) = 0. Therefore, either we return to case Tp = 0 
or  A=1/2. In the latter case, the condition g3 ≥ 0 translates into Tp ≥ - Cp/(2(B - A)), that is, any 
non-negative value of Tp is acceptable. 
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Case VI) λ4 = 0, g3 = 0 gives, for (A18):          
       | tp | =  - λ3 (B – A) / A 
       | Tp | =  λ3 (B – A) / (1 – A) 
        (Tp – tp) [B – A] + Cp = 0 
        tp A + Tp [1 – A] ≥ 0 
The first can be satisfied only if tp = 0 and we have this if λ3 = 0 or B = A. In both cases there would 
be Tp = 0 and from the third Cp = 0, against the hypotheses. This case can therefore not be verified.  
Case VII) λ3 = 0, λ4 = 0  gives  
(A22)         tp = Tp = 0   
already seen in case V). 
Finally, case VIII) g3 = 0, g4 = 0 is equivalent to: 
Tp – tp = - Cp / (B – A) 
Tp = A (Tp – tp) 
 This case is possible only if Cp = 0 and if so the solution is  
Tp = tp = 0 
or if A > B and this goes against common sense. 
 
B. Contract with two agents in the non-electoral period 
Problem of constrained optimization 
 
The constraints can be expressed in short form, by saying: 
(B1) 
g1 = E(Ib | eb = 1) - E(Ib | eb = 0) = (Tb – tb) [Pr(Bs | eb = 1) - Pr(Bs | eb = 0) - Cb
g2 = E(Ib | eb = 1) = tb [1 - Pr(Bs | eb = 1)] + Tb Pr(Bs | eb = 1) - Cb
g3 = E(Ip | ep = 1) - E(Ip | ep = 0) = (Tp-tp) [Pr(Ps | ep = 1) - Pr(Ps | ep=0)] - Cp
g4 = E(Ip | ep = 1) = tp [1 – Pr(Ps | ep = 1)] + Tp Pr(Ps | ep = 1) – Cp
 
and therefore constraints (23)-(26) can be written: 
(B2)  g1 ≥ 0 g2 ≥ 0  g3 ≥ 0  g4 ≥ 0. 
Proceeding as in the previous case, conditions of the 1st order are given by (A3)-(A6) and, for the 
same reasons, we have 
(B3) 
g1 = (Tb – tb) [Pr(Bs | e11) - Pr(Bs | e01)] - Cb = (Tb – tb) (P2b – P0b) – Cb
g2 = tb (1 – P2b) + Tb P2b – Cb
g3 = (Tp - tp) [Pr(Ps | e11) - Pr(Ps | e10)] – Cp = (Tp - tp) [B - A] – Cp
g4 = tp [1 - Pr(Ps | e11)] + Tp Pr(Ps | e11) - Cp = tp [1 - B] + Tp B – Cp
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Conditions (A3) translate into : 
           -u’(tb) [P2p (1 - P2b) + (1 - P2p) (1 - P2b)] - λ1 (P2b - P0b) + λ2 (1 - P2b) = 0 
           -u’(Tb) [P1p P2b + (1 - P1p) P2b] + λ1 (P2b - P0b) + λ2 P2b = 0 
           -u’(tp) (1 – B) – λ3 (B – A) + λ4 (1 – B) = 0 
           -u’(Tp) B + λ3 (B – A) + λ4 B = 0, 
which gives: 
(B4) 
| tb | = λ2 - λ1 (P2b - P0b) / (1 - P2b) 
| Tb |  = λ2 + λ1 (P2b - P0b) / P2b
| tp  | = λ4  - λ3 (B – A) / (1 - B)  
| Tp | = λ4 + λ3 (B – A) / B 
    
C. Contract with a single agent in the elctoral period. 
Problem of constrained optimization 
 
Keeping in mind the conditional probabilities (4)i-(7)i  the constraints become 
 
           g1 = T10 [Pr(E1 | e10) – Pr(E1 | e00)] + T11 [Pr(E2 | e10) – Pr(E2 | e00)] +  
               + T01 [Pr(E3 | e10) – Pr(E3 | e00)] + T00 [Pr(E4 | e10) – Pr(E4 | e00)] - (Cbp – Cp) =  
               = T10 [P1b (1 – P3p) – P3b (1 – P3p)] + T11 [P1b P3p – P3b P3p] +  
               + T01 [(1 – P1b) P0p – (1 – P3b) P0p] + T00 [(1 - P1b)(1 - P0p) – (1 - P3b)(1- P0p)] - (Cbp – Cp ) =  
               = (P1b – P3b) [T10 (1 – P3p) + T11 P3p – T01 P0p – T00 (1 – P0p)] – (Cbp – Cp) ≥ 0                    
              
           g2 = T10 [Pr(E1 | e10) – Pr(E1 | e11)] + T11 [Pr(E2 | e10) – Pr(E2 | e11)] +  
                + T01 [Pr(E3 | e10) – Pr(E3 | e11)] + T00 [Pr(E4 | e10 ) – Pr(E4 | e11)] + Cp = 
                = T10 [P1b (1 – P3p) – P2b (1 – P1p)] + T11 [P1b P3p – P2b P1p] +  
                + T01 [(1 – P1b) P0p – (1 – P2b) P2p] + T00 [(1 - P1b) (1 - P0p) – (1- P2b) (1 - P2p)] + Cp ≥ 0                  
(C1) 
       
          g3 = T10 [Pr(E1 | e10) – Pr(E1 | e01)] + T11 [Pr(E2 | e10) – Pr(E2 | e01)] +  
               + T01 [Pr(E3 | e10) – Pr(E3 | e01)] + T00 [Pr(E4 | e10) – Pr(E4 | e01)] + (Cp – Cb) =  
               = T10 [P1b (1 – P3p) – P0b (1 – P1p)] + T11 [P1b P3p – P0b P1p] +  
               + T01 [(1 – P1b) P0p – (1 – P0b) P2p] + T00 [(1 - P1b)(1 - P0p) – (1 - P0b)(1 - P2p)] +  
               + (Cp – Cb) ≥ 0 
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             g4 = T10 Pr(E1 | e10) + T11 Pr(E2 | e10) + T01 Pr(E3 | e10) + T00 Pr(E4 | e10) –  (Cbp – Cp) = 
                 = T10 [P1b (1 – P3p)] + T11 [P1b P3p] + T01 [(1 – P1b) P0p] +  
                  + T00 [(1 - P1b) (1 - P0p)] - (Cbp – Cp) ≥ 0 
Considering the Lagrangian (A1), the conditions of the 1st order are given (A3)-(A6) and in 
particular (A3) translate into: 
 
-u’(T10) (1 – P3p) P1b + λ1 [(P1b – P3b) (1 – P3p)] + λ2 [P1b (1 – P3p) – P2b (1 – P1p)] +  
              + λ3 [P1b (1 – P3p) – P0b (1 – P1p)] + λ4[P1b (1 – P3p)] = 0 
-u’(T11) P3p P1b + λ1 [P1b P3p – P3b P3p] + λ2  [P1b P3p – P2b P1p] + λ3 [P1b P3p – P0b P1p] + λ4 [P1b P3p] = 0 
-u’(T01) P0p (1 – P1b) + λ1[(1 – P1b) P0p – (1 – P3b) P0p] + λ2 [(1 – P1b) P0p – (1 – P2b) P2p] + 
              + λ3 [(1 – P1b) P0p – (1 – P0b) P2p] + λ4[(1 – P1b) P0p] = 0 
-u’(T00) (1 – P0p) (1 – P1b) + λ1 [(1 - P1b) (1 - P0p) – (1 - P3b) (1 - P0p)] +  
              + λ2 [(1 - P1b) (1 - P0p) – (1 - P2b) (1 - P2p)] + λ3 [(1 - P1b) (1 - P0p) – (1 - P0b) (1 - P2p)] +  
              + λ4 [(1 -P1b) (1 - P0p)] = 0 
which we can also write: 
 
          |T10 | =  λ1 (1 – P3b / P1b) + λ2 [1 – P2b (1 – P1p) / (P1b (1 – P3p))] +  
                              + λ3  [1 – P0b (1 – P1p) / (P1b (1 – P3p))] + λ4
          |T11| =  λ1 (1 – P3b / P1b) + λ2  [1 – P2bP1p / (P1b P3p)] + λ3 [1 – P0b P1p / (P1b P3p)] + λ4 
(C2) 
         |T01| = λ1 [1 – (1 – P3b) / (1 - P1b)] + λ2 [1 – (1 – P2b) P2p / ((1 – P1b) P0p)] + 
                             + λ3 [1 – (1 – P0b) P2p / (1 – P1b) P0p] + λ4
         |T00| = λ1 [1 – (1 - P3b) / (1 - P1b) ] + λ2 [1 – (1 - P2b) (1 - P2p) / (1 - P1b) (1 - P0p)] + 
                             + λ3  [1 – (1 - P0b) (1 - P2p) / (1 - P1b) (1 - P0p)] + λ4
or in more explicit terms: 
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 The solution to this problem is not easy, however it is less important to know the value of incentives 
that maximize E (U – u | e10), than to know if it is more advantageous to appoint two agents or a 
single agent.  To resolve the problem, we have to compare the utility expected by the politician with 
a single a single agent, with the expected utility with two separate authorities. 
 
D. Contract with a single agent in the non-electoral period. 
Problem of constrained optimization 
 
Keeping conditional probabilities (4)i-(7)i  in mind  the constraints become 
 
            g1 = T11 [Pr(E1 | e11) – Pr(E1 | e10)] + T10 [Pr(E2 | e11) – Pr(E2 | e10)] +  
                 + T01 [Pr(E3 | e11) – Pr(E3 | e10)] + T00 [Pr(E4 | e11) – Pr(E4 | e10)]- [Cbp - (Cbp – Cp)] =  
                = T11 [P2b P1p – P1b P3p] + T10 [P2b (1 - P1p) – P1b (1 - P3p)] +  
                 + T01 [(1 – P2b) P2p – (1 – P1b) P0p] + T00 [(1 - P2b) (1 - P2p) – (1 - P1b) (1 - P0p)]- Cp  ≥ 0  
                    
             g2  = T11 [Pr(E1 | e11) – Pr(E1 | e01)] + T10 [Pr(E2 | e11) – Pr(E2 | e01)] +  
                  + T01 [Pr( E3 | e11) – Pr(E3 | e01)] + T00 [Pr(E4 | e11) – Pr(E4 | e01)] - Cb = 
                  = T11 [P2b P1p – P0b  P1p] + T10 [P2b (1 - P1p) – P0b (1 - P1p)] +  
                   + T01 [(1 – P2b) P2p – (1 – P0b) P2p] + T00 [(1 - P2b) (1 - P2p) – (1 - P0b) (1 - P2p)] -  Cb = 
                            = (P2b – P0b) [T11 P1p + T10(1 – P1p) – T01 P2p – T00 (1 – P2p)] - Cb  ≥ 0  
(D1) 
             g3 = T11 [Pr(E1 | e11) – Pr(E1 | e00)] + T10 [Pr(E2 | e11) – Pr(E2 | e00)] +  
                  + T01 [Pr(E3 | e11) – Pr(E3 | e00)] + T00 [Pr(E4 | e11) – Pr(E4 | e00)] – Cbp = 
                 = T11 [P2b P1p – P3b P3p] + T10 [P2b (1 - P1p) – P3b(1 - P3p)] +  
                  + T01 [(1 – P2b) P2p – (1 – P3b) P0p] + T00 [(1 -P2b) (1 - P2p) – (1 - P3b) (1 - P0p)] - Cbp  ≥ 0  
 
              g4 = T11 P2b P1p + T10 P2b (1 - P1p) + T01 (1 – P2b) P2p + T00 (1 - P2b) (1 - P2p) - Cbp  = 
                  = P2b [T11 P1p + T10 (1 – P1p)] + (1 – P2b) [T01 P2p + T00 (1 - P2p)] – Cbp  ≥ 0 . 
 
Considering the Lagrangian (A1), the conditions of the 1st order are given (A3)-(A6) and in 
particular (A3)  translate into :        
-u’(T11) P2b P1p + λ1 [P2b P1p – P1b P3p] + λ2 [P2b P1p – P0b P1p] + λ3  [P2b P1p – P3b P3p] + λ4 P2b P1p = 0 
-u’(T10) P2b (1 - P1p) + λ1 [P2b (1 - P1p) – P1b(1 - P3p)] + λ2 [P2b (1 - P1p) – P0b (1 - P1p)] +   
             + λ3 [P2b (1 - P1p) – P3b (1 - P3p)] + λ4 P2b (1 - P1p) = 0 
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-u’(T01) (1 – P2b) P2p + λ1 [(1 – P2b) P2p – (1 – P1b) P0p] + λ2 [(1 – P2b) P2p – (1 – P0b) P2p] + 
             + λ3 [(1 – P2b) P2p – (1 – P3b) P0p] + λ4 (1 – P2b) P2p = 0 
- u’(T00) (1 - P2b) (1 - P2p) + λ1 [(1-P2b) (1 - P2p) – (1 - P1b) (1 - P0p)] +  
             + λ2 [(1 - P2b) (1 - P2p) – (1 - P0b) (1 - P2p)] + λ3  [(1 - P2b) (1 - P2p) – (1 - P3b) (1 - P0p)] +  
             + λ4 (1 - P2b) (1 - P2p)  = 0 
which we can also write: 
 
            |T11| = λ1 [1 – P1b P3p  / (P2b P1p)] + λ2 [1 – P0b P1p  / (P2b P1p)] + λ3 [1 – P3b P3p  / (P2b P1p)] + λ4
            |T10| = λ1 [1 – P1b (1 - P3p) / (P2b (1 - P1p))] + λ2 [1 – P0b (1 - P1p) / (P2b (1 - P1p))] +  
(D2)              + λ3 [1 – P3b (1 - P3p) / (P2b (1 - P1p))] + λ4 
           |T01| = λ1 [1 – (1 – P1b) P0p / ((1 – P2b) P2p)] + λ2 [1 – (1 – P0b) P2p / ((1 – P2b) P2p)] + 
                     + λ3  [1 – (1 – P3b) P0p / ((1 – P2b )P2p)] + λ4
            |T00| = λ1 [1 – (1 - P1b) (1 - P0p) / ((1 - P2b) (1 - P2p))] + λ2 [1 – (1 - P0b) (1 - P2p) /  
                              / ((1 - P2b) (1 - P2p))] +  λ3 [1 – (1 - P3b) (1 - P0p) / ((1 - P2b) (1 - P2p))] + λ4
 
E. We prove some inequalities 
 
(E1) ( ) (( )
)
2
22 11
12
1
yx
xyxy
x −
−−−≥−  
since 2x – 1 > 0 and 0 < x, y < 1. 
(E1) is equivalent to 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )1211 222 −−−−≥− xxyxyyx  
 
x2 + y2 – 2xy ≥ [ x + 2y2x - 2 x y - y2 ] (2x - 1)  
 
x2 + y2 – 2xy ≥  2 x2 + 4x2y2– 4 x2y - 2xy2 - x – 2xy2+ 2 x y + y2  
 
4x2y + 4xy2 + x ≥   x2 + 4x2y2 + 4 x y  
 
4xy + 4y2 + 1 ≥   x + 4xy2 + 4  y  
 
4xy (1 – y )+ 1 – x  ≥   4  y ( 1 – y ) 
 
1 – x  ≥   4  y ( 1 – y ) ( 1 – x ) 
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1 /4 ≥   y ( 1 – y )  
this last inequality being true, the first is true. 
(E2) (1 – y)2 x – y2 (1 – x)  
can only be positive, if 0 < y ≤ 1/2 and y ≤ x. 
 (1 – y)2 x – y2 (1 – x) ≥ 0  
equivalent to   
( (1 – y)/y )2 ≥ (1 – x)/x ;  
since if 0 < y ≤ 1/2 then (1 – y )/y ≥ 1, we get ( (1 – y)/y )2 ≥ (1 – y)/y and as funzion  
f(x) = (1 – x) / x  
is decrescent and y ≤ x, we will have 
( (1 – y)/y )2 ≥ (1 – y)/y  ≥ (1 – x)/x  
the equality is valid only if  
x = y. 
(E3)  y/ [2(x – y)] ≤ [(1 – y)2 x – y2 (1 – x)]/[2(x – y)2] ≤ 1 / [2(x – y)]  
 if 0 < y ≤ 1/2 and y ≤ x for the first inequality and 0 < y ≤ 1/2 ≤ x for the second. 
The first inequality is equivalent to 
  y(x – y) ≤ (1 – y)2 x – y2 (1 – x) ⇔  yx  ≤ (1 – y)2 x + y2 x 
  which means : 
yx(1 – y) ≤ (1 – y)2 x ⇔  y  ≤ (1 – y) ⇔  y  ≤ 1/2. 
The second inequality is equivalent to  
 (1 – y)2 x – y2 (1 – x) ≤ x – y ⇔   (1 + y2 – 2y)x – y2 + y2 x  ≤ x – y  
which means : 
2 y2 x + y   ≤ y (2x + y)  ⇔   2yx + 1 ≤ 2x + y  ⇔   1 – y  ≤ 2x (1 – y) 
That is, x ≥ 1/2. 
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